


The Armistice Day Newsletter

Issue 11



Voice from the gallery (during grave-digger scene in Hamlet). "AIN'T YER GOING TO 'AVE NO PARAPET?"

Punch 29th August 1917

A Diplomacy zine from Stephen Agar, 47 Preston Drive, BRIGHTON, BN1 6LA, UK. Email: stephen@armisticeday.com. Tel. 01273-562430. Cost 80p in the UK, £1.20 Europe, £1.50 USA, Far East and Australia. Free for download on the web at <http://www.armisticeday.com>

Editorial

Well, it doesn't seem like that long since I did the last issue – and unusually I haven't had any major computer problems in the intervening weeks. In fact, with all the recent developments regarding the future (or lack of it) for Royal Mail, work has been exceptionally busy and that has made the intervening weeks go past very quickly.

It was nice to meet Colin Bruce at the weekend – Colin popped down to have a look at the Zine Archives, and spent a few happy hours reading old issues of *Puppet Theatre News* from the 1970s. One thing that did occur to me when Colin visited, is that if anything happened to me, all those lovely old zines would probably end up in a landfill site. I don't want to be morbid or anything like that, but if I were to die suddenly poor Esme would be saddled with lots of "junk" that she wouldn't have a clue how to get rid of (though thanks to life assurance and a very generous death in service benefit she would also be a comfortably-off widow, so sympathy should only go so far). I mean, what would she do with a room full of old zines and almost 30 Diplomacy sets? (ideas on a postcard...) Perhaps I should try and push them on to the British Library – if they want copies of *Cut & Thrust* and *FWTDR*, maybe

copies of *Albion* No.1 or early *Dolchstoss* may be of interest.

Come to think of it, I don't even have a will – which is a sinful omission given I have kids. I always maintained that I would sort out a will with a specific requirement that the music at my funeral should be *Remember You're A Womble* and Gary Glitter's *Remember Me This Way*. However, the Wombles haven't aged well, and even in recent years concerning Mr Glitter's predilection for little girls, mean that *Remember Me This Way* has some very unintended double entendres. So I've had a rethink. These days I think I would choose Ron Sexsmith's *Speaking With The Angel* and Roy Woods's *Forever* (I've just got to have some 70's glam...). For those of you who want to make similarly embarrassing requests about your funeral, remember that there is always the danger that your nearest and dearest will stand in the way of your last wishes. The trick is to make a significant bequest to your executor which is conditional on your wishes being carried out, and in default the bequest goes to some worthy charity. Shame you can't actually be at your own funeral, as I think I would quite enjoy mine.

What an odd topic for an editorial.

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LETTERS



Howard Bishop

Nice issue. I enjoyed the bit about the assassination of FF. I'd read an article before, but this one filled in more of the political bits.

I agree with your comments about webzines. I think they work OK as a medium for playing games (as in *For Whom The Web Rocks*), but I remain to be convinced that they are anywhere near as enjoyable to browse as a good zine. A good analogy is the *NME*. I could get everything that appears in the paper version from the *NME* website, but although the text is just the same, it appears cold, flat and impersonal for some reason.

SA: I agree. I don't know how to solve that one. It is likely to be a temporary problem though, as the generation behind us won't be so fussy.

It was interesting to see the contrast between how the US and UK view their respective nationals captured as Taliban fighters. I was over in Boston last week and the news and current affairs programs were already warming up the electric chair. No suggestion that he might not be guilty. No attempt to understand what might have motivated him. The Tipton three have been handled somewhat differently, certainly in the reports I've heard and read. The US are becoming more and more isolationist, dangerously so in fact.

SA: My favourite quite of the month: "I don't think these people should be considered POWs. We're dealing with a bunch of killers, not military people." - (John Klumpp, national commander of the American Ex-Prisoners of War organization.)

I'm glad to see that a lot of the *BUM* games have found a home in *Armistice Day*. Jerry Spencer's excellent *Gridiron Morons* has also found it's way into the *Tangerine Terror* or it will if I ever get the next issue out.

Allan Stagg

Thanks for *Armistice Day* 10 (into double figures already!). Some more interesting articles, although I was sorry to hear of your medical and computer problems. I hope these are on their way to being mended.

Congratulations on your 7th place in the zine poll, I am certain that, barring accidents, this will be improved next year. It is sad to see some of the old established zines losing popularity, but what is more depressing is the dearth of new zines (apart from *Armistice Day*) that have made an impact.

SA: There aren't any new zines at all – Armistice Day scarcely counts. All very depressing.

Your playlist, as ever, is interesting, to say the least. I can admire your choice of Billy Bragg and Mott the Hoople, and I myself have the ELO and Stranglers LPs - but Dean Friedman??? This must have been purchased at a time when your hormones were affecting your judgement, surely?

SA: I am very fond of Dean Friedman (particularly his classic album Ha Ha Said the Rocking Chair – though I have all three of his albums on CD). OK, so he's a bit cheesy – but then so am I.

Richard Williams

I thought my comment on how fast Royal Mail had been would bring an appropriate remark. When they bother to work they are very good! It's when they don't is the major problem.

SA: Well, as our workforce has now voted 63% in favour of striking over a 5% pay demand (double the rate of inflation), they probably won't be working again in the near future...

I am well aware that one of the biggest problems down here is a massive shortage of staff. We have been in that position for nearly five years now. On top of that problem the Fareham delivery office has been

in dispute with local management for around a year on all other sorts of matters, which resulted in lots of unofficial strikes, especially during the summer months. That dispute is still ongoing and not about pay. Sadly the whole country is now likely to vote on that!

For the past eight weeks the service has been pretty good. IN fact since the staffing shortages began our most efficient service is at Christmas and New Year. It used to be the exact opposite.

As for having the worst service, you claim it s not measured at local level. If that is the case I assume the local media both printed and radio/TV have been telling lies. They have even had live interviews with people over this. Four places around the country were mentioned, one of which happened to be Fareham.

SA: I can't answer for your local media – I am staggered by some of the silly things I see reported. The Independent on Sunday even reckoned we were going to abolish postcodes and replace them with ones personal to the individual – which is a made up story.

Last week something happened which rather worried me, which may also explain why I have received mail for 55 of various Fareham road names recently. I was washing my car when a postman, who did not look like a relief one was wandering around looking lost. He came up to me and asked where 54 was. I almost felt like saying the one with 54 on the front door! It was probably too much for him that it was opposite 67! It is between 52 and 56 though.

SA: Presumably he hadn't done the round before. Although we set all postmen a basic literacy and numeracy test, we have had instances of people setting the test for friends who can't speak English, which then causes chaos.

As for the second mail, as far as I am concerned it has been abolished, as we certainly don't have a second delivery anymore, official or not.

SA: In many places that just means there isn't any mail to deliver after the first delivery rounds, due to the fact that mail gets into Delivery Offices several hours earlier than it used to.

Are you deliberately ignoring my queries about the Bourse and Intimate Diplomacy from *BUM*?

SA: No, sorry. I thought I'd said that I couldn't take the ID as well. Too much work. If any couples want to continue let me know and I'll find a volunteer GM. I'm not going to GM the Bourse, sorry.

Alex Bardy

Just a quick note to say thanks for AD- with the move to A4 I have to say that it strikes me that AD has well and truly returned to the tried and tested SpOff format of yore.

SA: I have a theory that each editor is only really capable of creating one type of zine. Over the years I have produced Pigmy, Here We Go Again, Variants & Uncles, Spring Offensive, The Tangled Web We Weave and Armistice Day – and truth to tell, they were all more or less the same zine. Take our noble Zine Poll winner, For Whom the Die Rolls. Twenty years earlier Keith produced another zine called Griffin, which was in reality exactly like FWTD (only the technology having changed). People don't fundamentally change, and neither do the zines they produce.

I was particularly interested to read of your PC problems and must confess to feeling smug (I'm sorry, but it's true) that I haven't yet made a second attempt to rebuild that Athlon system I spoke about way back in Oct 2001... maybe I'll just leave it another couple of months, eh? At least while ever it's not been built, it can't go wrong can it? Simple things please simple minds and all that... Truth be told I've only really got to transfer/fit the drives from the old machine into the new one, but there are far too many other things vying for my attention at the moment.

SA: I may be tempted into a processor upgrade to an Athlon XP 1900 or something like that – at least there isn't much to go wrong.

The latest 'problem' is that I've been promoted at work again, this time as part of a long-term incentive to try and keep me in the London/South East area a bit longer. Marie and I are still quite set on moving up to North Yorkshire (York) but I've been plied with 'presents' and a couple of not-so-golden 'handshakes' to keep me down here at least for the next 3-6 months.

Tim Deacon's comment regards electronic zines (e-zines) and your reply both had a ring of truth, and I would agree that an e-zine perhaps

needs a bit more discipline than conventional zines but they are surely MUCH easier to put together (without bells and whistles of course)? Mike Dean's psychazine.co.uk is an excellent example. He updates the board and then types up the results of turns ready for upload to the website. This is definitely a lot easier than fannying around with page layout, columns, etc. and the irrepressible need to 'clean up' those awkward spaces at the bottom of pages.

SA: *I know what you mean. I will finish AD tonight. It will take an extra 20 minutes to convert it into a PDF, upload it and put out an announcement to the mailing list telling people it is there. Yet it may make me an extra 3-4 days to print it out and mail it (though I always do non-email players copies first). But although I reckon the electronic audience for AD is about 280 (judging from the downloads), no discernable feedback appears from any of those readers!*

Having said that, I also think the concept of a website as a complement to a printed zine is also somewhat over-rated? it is simply not worth the effort I find, unless the intention is to use it merely as a resource/archive, and this has given me second thoughts re. my own website for example. However, I also believe the internet is a powerful tool (correction: probably THE most powerful tool) for cheap and cheerful promotion, and to this end I'm determined to get something akin to an online UKPBM journal/directory up and running.

I will start by doing individual pages for each zine, with contact details, etc. followed by postal games currently running and any waiting list details as up to date as possible (together with no. of players req'd to fill 'em). This way, every time I receive a new issue of a zine, I can update the details as necessary? if we can include links, pop-ups or 'tooltips' showing short descriptions for each postal game being played or offered we're halfway there. Then a couple of paragraphs of self-promotion from each zine editor and we're up and running. Sounds rather simple doesn't it? Oh dear...

An on-line form would also be a neat touch and since I check my emails daily, it shouldn't take more than a couple of days to put potential players in touch with GMs and zines as needed.

SA: *Well, as you know – I will give you postalgames.org.uk or even postalgames.com as a domain name if you want use of them. I just happen to have them around the place.*

David Oya speaks highly of Linux and is right of course, most technomorphs are put off by the amount of tweaking that can be done? I myself have a very different reason for declining a shift to Linux and sticking with the relative comfort(s) of Windows: If I made the move, I'd probably then feel duty-bound to try and learn as much about Linux as possible and thus add yet another item to my ridiculously long and already MASSIVE list of 'current interests'. Quite simply, 'tis all getting a tad too much, and I need some serious time for consolidation? a case of 'Retreat & Regroup' in Diplomacy parlance perhaps?

SA: *Linux? I know that this will amuse a minority – but I enjoyed this...*

Linux Developer Gets Laid

Philadelphia, PA - In news that is sure to excite the Linux community, long time Linux developer Todd Stanton got laid.

"I still have trouble believing it myself," said Todd. "I was doing some coding when my power supply blew. Instead of pulling out the spare like I usually would, I decided to head down to Best Buy to check out the new DVD releases. Nothing new was out, so I bought another copy of 'The Matrix' since the one I had was pretty worn out. Turns out the checkout girl was a Matrix fan too and well one thing led to another."

Word spread rapidly on message boards and on IRC. "It's pretty irresponsible of him and shows his lack of dedication to Linux and the open source movement," said Fred Simpson. "If others try to emulate this behavior then a lot of projects could get derailed."

Others like Gary Wilcox were glad to hear the news, "We're tired of all those Microsoft developers showing their Win-Ho's in our face. Now we can tell them about Todd. Who's laughing now?"

Some developers are also excited that this may increase their chances of getting lucky, but most are being realistic.

Walker Crandall said, "We thought we'd all be doing the hokey-pokey after Bill Fitzsimmons got some during the LinuxWorld Conference in 1999. We were fooling ourselves. Nobody got nothing."

This is the third such occurrence for Linux developers since 1991.

Bruce Edwards

I was never much good at history at school. Are you sure you're not a history teacher in disguise??

SA: *Good question. I have always loved history – though I was put off doing history at Oxford as they expected you to be able to read French as well. I think history is important, though some would disagree. I commented recently on a newsgroup that several surveys in the 90's pointed out the relative ignorance of American youth about 20th century history, to the extent that a majority of college leavers were found to believe that the Russians fought on the side of the Germans in WWII. This caused a debate where some said they wouldn't employ someone with so little knowledge and interest in the world, while others said so what, what does it matter? OK, it is a platitude to say that we should know history so we can avoid repeating our past mistakes, but on some sort of macro cultural level I think it holds true.*

I don't think I am a History teacher in disguise – maybe a frustrated academic - but I certainly wouldn't want anything to do with students/pupils!

Guy Thomas

Thanks for an interesting Issue 10, especially the full story of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although I've got a history degree and know the general gist, I'd never read about it in such detail.

It is fascinating to think that if a Bosnian student had picked a different corner shop from which to buy his sandwich, the assassination plot might never have succeeded, and we might never have had the First World War, the rise of Communism (which followed from the defeat of Russia in said war), the rise of Nazism (which followed from the defeat of Germany), the Second World War, the collapse of the European countries' empires, the Cold War, the rise of American globalism, the European Union... In fact, the whole world could be a lot different, in so many ways.

SA: *Frightening to think that so much is a consequence of fast food.*

One thing that would have happened anyway is the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, due to the ethnic divisions obvious from the Collapse Of The Dual Empire variant which you published. (I'm tempted by this, and you can feel free to put me on a waiting list.) But did it really have to involve a world war?

The ironic thing, if they had only but known it, was that the three European imperial powers whose alliance structures, foreign policies and militarism did most to make the war happen, were all signing their own death warrants. Within five years of 1914, there was no Hapsburg emperor, no Tsar and no Kaiser. Oh bugger, as they might have said in Vienna, St Petersburg and Berlin.

I was also fascinated by the More About Convoys article, which detailed more convoy paradoxes than I have ever imagined, but the more I read it, the more I found myself disagreeing with Rod Walker's adjudications of them. Perhaps the article betrays its 20-year age here?

SA: *Most certainly. I also found the article fascinating, which means we are both very sad people indeed.*

His analysis of examples 6A, 6B and 6C, concerning unwanted convoys, would be sneered at by most serious players today. He says his houserules would allow players to specify which fleets they were prepared to be convoyed by - but there is no provision in the rules for this practice, and if you followed it then, by logical extension, you would have to allow players to refuse supports as well. No sensible GM should go there!

SA: *Sadly that is where you are wrong. The current official rules (4th edition © 2000) specifically allow a player to state a preferred route so as to avoid unwanted convoys. I have put up all the various Diplomacy rulebooks on my web site - <http://www.diplomacy-archive.com/rules.htm>*

Slightly less obviously (and much less importantly), I'm not sure some of Rod's extreme Pandin's Paradoxes are paradoxes at all. Did any other experienced GMs take a close look at examples 5A and 5B? He says nothing moves in each case, presumably on the grounds that all the attempted convoys cut supports for attacks on the convoying fleets. But I'd be more tempted to rule that all of the fleets attacked in both cases, being unsupported, are dislodged, so that none of the armies have any impact at all.

What do you think? And what do other GMs think?

SA: *I am not so sure. Let's look at the examples in the article.*

5A. FRANCE: A Pic-Lon C by F ENG; F NWG-NTH S by F Nwy; F Bel S F ENG

GERMANY: A Yor-Bel C by F NTH; F Wal-ENG S by F IRI; F Lon S F NTH

The usual rule is that a convoyed attack cannot cut a support for an attack on the convoy – but in this instance the convoyed attack is cutting a support for an attack on another convoy. So you would effectively rule that attacks on convoys are adjudicated prior to convoyed attacks – but that is not what the rules say. 5B is just a more complicated version of the dilemma above. I don't think the rules make it clear what should happen in this situation – but I am prepared to be convinced otherwise.

Steve Cox

I am now not playing any Diplomacy by mail, for the first time in 10 years. However, I will not be signing up for another game. My last one - Juniper in **TCP** - was as enjoyable as they seem to come, with a dogged defence (by me) against overwhelming odds, one ally who saved me the trouble of stabbing him by bungling his own attack the season before, another who proved unexpectedly pliable, a proxy in my favour, a semi-successful unwanted convoy, and a better than expected outcome. Nevertheless, I have concluded that the risk one takes that the result in postal Dip will depend more on the pattern of NMR's and dropouts than on the effort one puts in is too high.

SA: *Of course many Internet games of Diplomacy run on a no NMR rule – games are simply not adjudicated until a full set of orders are in, and replacements are found as necessary (which can mean LOTS of standbys). As a consequence select groups of committed players (Such as the Vermont Group) have sprung up just for players with a proven track record to minimise dropouts – and this seems to work fairly well.*

The result isn't everything of course, but I now get my regular fix of whatever drug it is that games encourage my brain to produce from playing German style games instead. Admittedly these have trouble matching some of the thrills you get in a hard fought game of Dip, but then you avoid the downers as well. The designers prefer a game where everyone remains in contention throughout, so if you find yourself slipping behind there will often be rules to help you catch up, with or without assistance from the other players (e.g. extra carrots in *Hare And Tortoise*). Players are also supposed to win by their own efforts, not by forming cabals (e.g. you are never allowed to lend money to other players) and petty violence is discouraged by making aggression costly for the attacker as well as his target, so that the victor can never be quite sure that one of the onlookers isn't benefiting more than he is.

Consequently, it is only the current leader who needs to watch his back, and the tail ends tend to be ignored rather than being regarded as an easy meal. All of this makes it difficult to envisage a situation where one could be reduced by the other players to the equivalent of two centres, and then wheedle your way back to victory, or turn the game around in a single move with a devastating stab. But the huge variety of games provides more than enough compensation: dumping a bankrupt railroad on a hapless shareholder in 1830, making the optimum in-the-fist bid in Modern Art, engineering a favourable turn order in El Grande, judging the moment just right to expend carefully conserved resources in Taj Mahal, or to make the big jump to a key tribe in Vinci, or even just when to play your 15 in Hol's Der Geier. And all this several times in the space of an evening.

Perhaps it's all just another example of the search for instant gratification that seems to characterise society today - instant fame on Big Brother or Pop Idol, instant wealth in the lottery, instant health or pleasure through drugs, instant youth and beauty through plastic surgery, etc. Certainly there isn't the same sense of a community of devotees across the country bound together by a priesthood of editors

as there is in Diplomacy, but then it's easier to get a group together for face to face socialising. And it does require a certain amount of effort to get to grips with a new game every week!

SA: *I think it all depends on what you really want to get out of a hobby like this. I have never been primarily a games player – I am not very good at games and so tend to lose, but I am sufficiently competitive to dislike losing. I am in this hobby because I like creating things (zines, variants, articles), I like collecting things (zines, Diplomacy sets) and I like the implicit dishonesty, thrill of lying that I can get from a good game of Diplomacy. That's where I get my buzz. So although I am attracted to the socialising of general games playing (and I do need to "get out of the house more"), I can't help but be more attracted to sitting in my study on my own putting together a totally pointless article on the significance for the Diplomacy hobby of Vienna or considering issues arising from the various translations of the Diplomacy rules or... whatever. Between the two of us, I suspect your behaviour is the more normal.*

Richard Sharp

I read with horror your saga of combined technical and medical disaster. It made me feel my own problems were quite trivial and I should be ashamed of being late with **Dolchstoss** (again). You may be a political behemoth, but no one deserves a run of luck like that. Best wishes for happier times!

SA: *Many thanks. I feel substantially less fit than I was before my injury (even though by any objective standards I was not very fit then), with frequent muscle pains in my left leg when I have had to stand for more than a few minutes or have to use stairs. It's almost as though my muscles have aged 20 years in a few weeks. Either that or I am a weak and feeble man with hypochondriac tendencies (though according to Esme that covers all men anyway).*

Xenophobia by Stephen Agar

1. The Basic Rule:

Every move, every piece which is capable of mounting a supported attack on an enemy piece, must do so. However, this rule does not apply to multi-national attacks - only to supported attacks mounted by units belonging to the same Power.

2. Player Orders an Attack:

If a player submits attacking orders in line with the basic rule, then the player may decide what moves and what supports. Sometimes a unit may take part in a supported attack on more than one enemy unit - the player may choose which unit takes part, even if as a consequence another unit which would have taken part in a supported attack can no longer do so (i.e. if a player has a choice of two separate attacks of strength 2, or one attack strength 3 and a unit left over - then the player may elect to go for the strength 3 attack and thus the remaining unit no longer has to participate in an attack).

3. Player Fails to Order an Attack

Subject to the exception noted below, if a player fails to order a supported attack when one was possible, the GM will make the supported attack on his behalf. The following algorithm will be used:

Armies in alphabetical order attack first, supported by everything not yet ordered which can support them. Then fleets in alphabetical order attack second, supported by everything not yet ordered which can support them.

The remaining orders submitted by the player concerned will stand.

Exception: If a player uses units which would otherwise have been used for a compulsory attack in order to attack with potential foreign support, or support an attack by a foreign unit, then those orders may stand.

4. Player NMRs

If a player NMRs, supported attacks will still be made using the algorithm in rule 4 above. However, any unit not so attacking (or supporting an attack) will stand unordered.



Kaiser Wilhelm II

Wilhelm II, King of Prussia and German Kaiser, born 27 January 1859 in Berlin, died 5 June 1941 at Doorn in The Netherlands. Married Augusta Viktoria (1858-1921), Duchess of Schleswig-Holstein, in 1881; 7 children (6 sons; one daughter); married (second) the widow, Hermine, Princess of Reuss, (1886-1947), in 1922.

The eldest grandchild of Queen Victoria, Wilhelm symbolized his era and the nouveaux riche aspects of the German empire. The Kaiser suffered from a birth defect that left his left arm withered and useless. He overcame this handicap, but the effort to do so left its mark, and despite efforts of his parents to give him a liberal education, the prince became imbued with religious mysticism, militarism, anti-semitism, the glorification of power politics. Some have claimed that his personality displayed elements of a narcissistic personality disorder. Bombastic, vain, insensitive, and possessed with grandiose notions of divine right rule, his personality traits paralleled those of the new Germany: strong, but off balance; vain, but insecure; intelligent, but narrow; self-centred yet longing for acceptance.

Under the guise of training him for his future royal duties, Bismarck sought to mould Wilhelm into a conservative foil against his father's so-called liberalism. The scheme succeeded all too well but backfired when Friedrich died within four months of becoming emperor and Wilhelm proved uncontrollable. Soon after coming to the throne in 1888, Wilhelm distanced himself from his mother and dismissed Bismarck. Setting his own course, albeit a rather directionless one, he abandoned the Iron Chancellor's policy of keeping Russia and Austria-Hungary separated by allying with both. He allowed Germany's ties to Russia to lapse, a vacuum that France quickly filled. Bound now to the fate of Austria-Hungary, the real "sick man" of Europe, Wilhelm sought to break what he called Germany's encirclement. His efforts alternately amused or scared Europe. His penchant for uniforms and vainglorious pronouncements might have merely provoked derision and laughter had he headed some inconsequential nation, but Germany's army and economy dominated the Continent, and wish as they might, Europe's statesmen could not ignore him.

His inferiority complex and a love-hate relationship with England and his uncle (Edward VII) made him easy prey for the blandishments of Admiral Tirpitz and the Navy League. When Germany, the sole European nation with the industrial capability to rival England's naval dominance, began to construct a large, modern fleet, England's reaction was predictable. England viewed the German fleet as a mortal threat to her vital interests and she patched up her colonial differences with first France, then Russia, initiating military discussions with the French in 1906.

Historians still debate Germany's and Wilhelm's complicity in bringing about the war. A stronger indictment emerges from Wilhelm's hesitancy to halt the apparatus of war as it lurched towards the brink, propelled by mobilization plans and timetables. Wilhelm's last-minute anguish to General v. Moltke over the inflexibility of the Schlieffen Plan belied the fact that the Kaiser had known (and approved) the plan's contents for years. The outbreak of war did occasion one of Wilhelm's best speeches, his "Burgfrieden" (Peace of the Castle) speech in which he rallied all Germans to sublimate internal politics to the prosecution of the war. In that effort he proved a failure. As the war progressed, the professionals increasingly took charge, and Wilhelm retreated to the background. His zeal and spirit seemed to wane with Germany's military progress and, browbeaten into a number of disastrous cabinet

appointments by Ludendorff, his popularity plummeted. The final blow came when his ministers and the public understood Wilson's October armistice note to mean that the Kaiser's very presence prevented peace. At the end, his generals told him his troops would march home to restore order, but not in his name. It was best, they said, that he abdicate, but while he temporized, the Majority Socialists declared a republic on the morning of 9 November 1918. After 300 years, the Hohenzollern dynasty was finished.

The Kaiser fled to The Netherlands on 10 November 1918. He purchased an estate at Doorn where he maintained a tiny household. Following the death of the Kaiserine in 1921, he married a widow, Princess v. Schoenaich (Hermine of Reuss) a year later. The same year he published his memoirs, absolving himself of any war guilt. Over the next two decades, he received visitors and kept abreast of events in Europe. After a brief interest in the Nazis, spurred by Hitler's manipulation of the restoration issue, the imperial couple turned against the brown shirts. Death came in 1941, and he was buried on the grounds of his estate.

The Daily Telegraph

The Kaiser has been accused of many things; suffice it to say that "political correctness" was never one of them. The *Daily Telegraph* affair provides an interesting insight into the Emperor's personality. The affair polarized the sentiments of the British public against Germany at a pivotal time when the German naval build-up already had the island nation worried. This was not the result the Kaiser had in mind. He intended the interview as yet another olive branch offering to Britain.

The interview was conducted by Colonel Stuart-Wortley who wished it published in the London *Daily Telegraph*. The Kaiser obtained the manuscript and, according to the German constitution, submitted it to his Prime Minister, Prince Bernhard von Bulow, for review and approval. Too busy for the task, von Bulow passed the interview on to the State Secretary's Office requesting the document be reviewed for any inappropriate comments and returned to him. The task of editor ultimately fell to one Rienhold Klehmet, counsellor in the political division for some 12 years.

Here's where issues start to get cloudy. Klehmet was somehow under the impression that the Kaiser wished the document published in an "as-is" state, so he only edited it for form, not content. He promptly returned the document to von Bulow as requested who, without reading it, or so he claimed, sent it on to Stuart-Wortley. It was published, "as-is", in the *Daily Telegraph* on 8-Oct-1908. Among the Kaiser's implications: - The German people, in general, do not care for the British. - The French and the Russians had tried to persuade Germany to enter into the Boer War against the British. - The German naval build-up was aimed more at Japan than the British.

Thus he successfully alienated the British, the Franco-Russo alliance, and Japan all in one fell swoop. In other countries the interview was received with feelings ranging from horror to amusement. The unusual thing about this whole mess was that von Bulow *knew* the Emperor and he *knew* of the importance of the interview. Why he would disregard his constitutional responsibilities, not to mention plain common sense, and allow it to be published blindly has been argued for some time. A common belief is that he would attempt to use the tangle that followed to further his own political position. Up to his dying day, von Bulow maintained he had not read the interview prior to its publication.

Rather than further von Bulow's career, the *Daily Telegraph* affair greatly contributed to the end of it. He resigned from office 26-Jun-1909 and was replaced by Theobald von Bethmann-Holweg. The Kaiser kept a low profile for many months after the affair.

The interview of the Emperor Wilhelm II on October 28, 1908.

"You English," he said, "are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not to them but to those who misinterpret and distort them. That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous,

mistrustful eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press-- , at least, a considerable section of it - bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?

"I repeat," continued His Majesty, "that I am a friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements as it is in England with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your archenemy. You make it hard for me. Why is it?" . . .

His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in his mind -- his proved friendship for England. "I have referred," he said, "to the speeches in which I have done all that a sovereign can do to proclaim my good-will. But, as actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile -- bitterly hostile. But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask themselves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were feted in Holland, France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. But when they asked me to receive them -- I refused. The agitation immediately died away, and the delegation returned empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy?

"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German government was invited by the governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms of the telegram -- now in the archives of Windsor Castle in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity.

"Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction, and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then, I dispatched it to England, and that document, likewise, is among the state papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the severely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts, and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, an act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say!

"But, you will say, what of the German navy? Surely, that is a menace to England! Against whom but England are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing empire. She has a worldwide commerce which is rapidly expanding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Her horizons stretch far away." . . .



**Kaiser Wilhelm II's Account of the Events of July 1914
(From his Memoirs)**

After the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week and went back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral. But I was asked from there to give up this plan. Later I heard that one of the reasons for this was consideration for my personal safety; to this I naturally would have paid no attention.

Greatly worried on account of the turn which matters might now take, I decided to give up my intended journey to Norway and remain at home. The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office held a view contrary to mine and wished me to undertake the journey, as they considered that it would have a quieting effect on all Europe. For a long time I argued against going away from my country at a time when the future was so unsettled, but Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me, in short and concise terms, that if I were now to give up my travel plans, which were already widely known, this would make the situation appear more serious than it had been up to that moment and possibly lead to the outbreak of war, for which I might be held responsible; that the whole world was merely waiting to be put out of suspense by the news that I, in spite of the situation had quietly gone on my trip.

Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the General Staff, and, when he also proved to be calm and unworried regarding the state of affairs and himself asked for a summer leave of absence to go to Carlsbad, I decided, though with a heavy heart, upon my departure.

The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 5th in reality never took place. It is an invention of malevolent persons. Naturally, before my departure, I received, as was my custom, some of the Ministers individually, in order to hear from them reports concerning their departments. Neither was there any council of Ministers and there was no talk about war preparations at a single one of the conferences. My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords, as usual, while I was on my summer vacation trip. During my stay at Balholm I received only meagre news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely principally on the Norwegian newspapers, from which I got the impression that the situation was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor and the Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home, but was asked each time not to interrupt my journey.

When I learned that the English fleet had not dispersed after the review at Spithead, but had remained concentrated, I telegraphed again to

Berlin that I considered my return necessary. My opinion was not shared there.

But when, after that, I learned from the Norwegian newspapers-- not from Berlin - about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I started without further ado upon my return journey and commanded the fleet to repair to Wilhelmshaven. Upon my departure I learned from a Norwegian source that it was said that a part of the English fleet had left secretly for Norway in order to capture me (though peace still reigned!). It is significant that Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador, was informed on July 26th at the Foreign Office that my return journey, undertaken on my own initiative, was to be regretted, since agitating rumors might be caused by it.

Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chancellor and the Foreign Office in conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, since General von Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas the other two stuck firmly to their view that thing would not get to such a bad pass, that there would be some way of avoiding war, provided I did not order mobilization. This dispute kept up steadily. Not until General von Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire to their frontier posts, torn up the frontier railway tracks, and posted red mobilization notices did a light break upon the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse and bring about their own collapse and that of their powers of resistance. They had not wished to believe in the war.

This shows plainly how little we had expected -- much less prepared for -- war in July, 1914. When, in the spring of 1914, Czar Nicholas II was questioned by his Court Marghal as to his spring and summer plans, he replied: "He resterai chez moi cette année parce que nous aurons la guerre" ("I shall stay at home this year because we shall have war"). (This fact, it is said, was reported to Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann; I heard nothing about it then and learned about it for the first time in November, 1918.) This was the same Czar who gave me, on two separate occasions - at Björkö and Baltisch-Port - entirely without being pressed by me and in a way that surprised me, his word of honour as a sovereign, to which he added weight by a clasp of the hand and an embrace, that he would never draw his sword against the German Emperor - least of all as an ally of England - in case a war should break out in Europe, owing to his gratitude to the German Emperor for his attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which England alone had involved Russia, adding that he hated England, since she had done him and Russia a great wrong by inciting Japan against them.

At the very time that the Czar was announcing his summer war program I was busy at Corfu excavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden, and, finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes war and prepares it in such a way that he can suddenly fall upon his neighbours - a task requiring long secret mobilization preparations and concentration of troops - does not spend months outside his own country and does not allow his Chief of the General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of absence. My enemies, in the meantime, planned their preparations for an attack.

Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The menace of war was not seen because the Foreign Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "surtout pas d'histoires" ("above all, no stories"), its belief in peace at any cost, that it had completely eliminated war as a possible instrument of Entente statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore, did not rightly estimate the importance of the signs of war.

Selected Quotes

"only fit to live in a country house and grow turnips" The Kaiser on Czar Nicholas II

"a very nice boy" The Kaiser on King George V (only six years his junior)

"He is Satan, you cannot imagine what a Satan he is" The Kaiser on King Edward VII

"a spirited note, what?" The Kaiser on the ultimatum to Serbia

"A great moral victory for Vienna, but with it, every reason for war disappears." The Kaiser on the Serbian reply to the ultimatum

"Gentlemen, you will regret this." The Kaiser to the general staff on the decision to mobilize

TWO TOPICS IN THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

As Seen by a Diplomacy Player

by Allan B. Calhamer

We will consider here first the American decision at the outset of armed participation in the war, to concentrate on the European rather than the Pacific war. Second, we will consider certain diplomatic and military manoeuvres leading up to the war between Japan and the United States.

In addition to general material, we will rely on Romerstein and Breindel, *The Venona Secrets*, Regnery, Washington, D. C. (2000); Stinnett, *Day of Deceit*, Free Press, N. Y. (2000); and Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral*, Kodansha International, Tokyo (1979).

The first book came about because the United States intercepted and decoded Russian cable traffic from 1941 to 1948. This material was only released to the public in 1995. The second book came about because the United States intercepted and decoded Japanese radio transmissions in 1940 and 1941. This material was released to the public in 1987. The third book is a life of Admiral Yamamoto, first published in Japanese. The first two books are highly contentious; however, their points of contention have little or nothing to do with this essay.

When America entered the war in late 1941, it was soon known that America intended to concentrate on the European theatre, principally in order to keep Germany from defeating either Britain or Russia. In a Diplomacy game, a successful invasion picks up supply centres. Some invasions also defeat a Great Power, knocking it out of the game, giving the invader a newly secure frontier which his country does not ordinarily have. Typically this advantage lasts a long time, sometimes all game. The result is that the second type of successful invasion is usually much more valuable than the first.

When the Germans captured the Balkans and a large part of European Russia, in a comparable Diplomacy game they would have been picking up supply centres; but they did not defeat a Great Power. When they first violated their non-aggression pact with Russia to attack that country by surprise, in a comparable Diplomacy game this action might have been referred to as a "huge stab". When they got to the gates of Moscow at the end of 1941, the action in a comparable Diplomacy game might have been referred to as a "glorious stab". When their drive fell short, failing to eliminate Russia, however, adding supply centres but also incurring a new enemy at the Great Power level, the action in a comparable Diplomacy game might begin to be referred to as an "ill-advised stab".

If it had finally been agreed by the players that Germany was in such danger of being attacked by Russia that pre-emption was warranted; but that the attack was doomed to fall short, or faced a high probability of falling short, it might have been agreed that Germany "failed to fight his way out of the central position", "failed to fight his way to the edge", "gambled but failed to overcome the position", or whatever.

If the United States ever invaded Europe from the west, it would very much want the Russian fighting entity to be still in existence, especially as it was diametrically on the opposite side of Germany from the American invasion. If you prefer your enemy to be hit on the flank, rather than frontally, you prefer even more that he be hit in the rear.

At the same time, there was a danger that Germany would defeat Britain, principally through the submarine blockade. Winston Churchill announced that if Britain were defeated, it would fight on from the Empire. Probably it would have been easy to withdraw the British fleet to Canada, South Africa, or wherever.

Germany and Italy did not seem like much of a threat to the United States, because their combined fleets were smaller than the American fleet, and they had no aircraft carrier. But the British fleet at that time was huge; and Churchill, contrary to his public statements, privately informed President Roosevelt that, if Britain were defeated, he would offer the British fleet to Germany in return for favourable surrender terms. No one knows whether he meant it or not; he may not have decided the point, but he might as well have used the threat. America was to send war material, or Britain might go down, and might offer the fleet to Germany.

The Diplomacy player is aware that if Germany occupies France and Britain in that game, he typically develops a fleet as large as the British fleet in a successful British game; he has an extremely strong position, close to a win, and a powerful naval game. In the actual game, Germany might have used the British fleet to invade America, or merely to deny her the use of the oceans.

The comparable threat is common in a Diplomacy game. "I'm going down unless I get help", says the player; "You are not positioned to get any of the spoil, and then you will face countries strengthened by their gains against me. They will also be strengthened because they will no longer have my forces opposing them." No agreement is, typically, offered or asked for. The communication is purely informational: give me some help, or I will go down, and you will lose by it. I have seen this appeal work; I have seen it strongly affect the course of the game; I have seen it save the day. The United States responded by shipping huge quantities of war material to Britain, convoying the ships halfway across the Atlantic, and, although neutral, fighting the German submarines.

There are, of course, any number and kind of cooperative arrangements that fall short of a full alliance, both in the Game and in the real thing. The United States had gone so far that it publicly described its policy as "all aid short of war".

England and France had agreed that England would cover France's north coast, while France moved its entire fleet to the Mediterranean. In a comparable Diplomacy game, they might agree to leave the English Channel empty; France would raise fleets only in the Mediterranean and send his existing fleet to the Mediterranean, while England would interest himself in the North Sea and the Baltic.

When France fell, most of its fleet was at Toulon, near Marseilles. A significant squadron, however, was at Oran in Algeria. In one of their earliest successes of the war, the British surprised the French squadron in the harbour. After negotiations, the French, who were now neutral, and extremely vulnerable to Germany, refused to cooperate; whereupon the British bombarded and destroyed the squadron in port.

Now in the Game of Diplomacy, force is projected into a smaller power - commonly called a "neutral" by players - only in the form of occupation, or in preventing occupation by another Great Power. The Game is not detailed enough to allow for the bombardment of a fleet in port. However, the following considerations still are likely to be common both to the game and to real actions such as that at Oran: 1) force is projected into neutrals: 2) force projection into neutrals is decided, by whichever Great Power, upon its own judgment; 3) the dominant sea power is likely to make a special effort to maintain this dominance.

By comparison, the Japanese advance into Southeast Asia won a lot of supply centres, especially in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) which produced a great deal of oil, which was in short supply in Japan. However, it did not threaten to defeat a Great Power. The principal fighting entities appear to have been China, the Philippines, Australia, the British base at Singapore, and British India; none of them at the Great Power level.

In China the Japanese had occupied territory inhabited by 98% of the Chinese people, but they could not subdue the hinterland. Both the Nationalists and the Communists believed that the best they could do was to tie down as many Japanese troops as possible, while waiting for help from overseas countries. Eventually they did finish the war on the winning side, but it took nine years.

Singapore and the Philippines were captured quickly. American effort helped defend Australia. British India was defended when British and American troops defeated the Japanese in Burma (now Myanmar).

In early 1941 the Great Powers in the world were five in number, extending in a ring around the Northern Hemisphere: Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. Of these, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan were bound to each other by non-aggression pacts. Germany was fighting England, and the United States was aiding England. At this point, the Soviet Union made an effort to stir up war between Japan and the United States.

This was done when a Soviet agent, Vitaly Pavlov, wrote a set of demands for the United States to serve upon Japan, and transmitted them to Harry Dexter White, a high U. S. Treasury Department official, and undercover Soviet agent. Venona, Page 41. The demands, employing "extremely harsh language", called for Japan to withdraw from China and Manchuria, and to sell a large part of its armaments to

the United States. Needless to say, it was not at all likely that the Japanese would do this at the behest of the United States.

Why did the Soviet Union want this war? First of all, their theory called for promoting wars among the "bourgeois" countries. Of course, if Japan lost, Russia was placed to pick up spoil; especially Manchuria, big, rich, and in Russia's line of advance; which Russia eventually did pick up, one week in 1945.

If Japan had won, however, Russia would have had a stronger, more assertive Japan on its flank. Russia must have discounted this possibility.

If the U.S. won, there would be a stronger and more assertive U.S. to deal with. Probably the Russians weren't worried about this possibility because Russia and the U.S. hardly conflicted anywhere in the world. If Russia and the U.S. could emerge as the strongest countries, then England, Germany, and Japan would be caught between them; but since they were closer to Russia and on the same land mass, Russia would have good chances of invading, revolutionizing, or Finlandizing them. The Russians might have supposed, entirely incorrectly as it turned out, that because of its remote location, the U.S.A. might not involve itself at all.

Nothing came of Pavlov's initiative in May, 1941. By June, the situation had changed dramatically as Germany attacked Russia. Germany was now fighting England and Russia, while Japan was allied to Germany, and continued its non-aggression pact with Russia. In the real thing, as in the game, a country can maintain agreements at the highest level with two powers that are fighting each other.

Now it was much more important to the Soviet Union than before that Japan fight America, so that it would not fight Russia. A Russian spy located in Japan jumped the gun in September, 1941, cabling home that the Soviet Union was "saved", because Japan would attack the U. S. Venona Page 37.

Harry Dexter White sent the Russian-written ultimatum up again in November, 1941, to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, a Cabinet secretary who dabbled in foreign policy. This time Morgenthau sent it on to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. Hull sprang an ultimatum on the Japanese envoys, demanding withdrawal from China, and French Indo-China, and from the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. Agawa Page 272. Some of the actual wording of this message had originated with Vitaly Pavlov. Venona Pages 41-44.

Agawa points out that Germany had carefully avoided declaring war on the U.S.A., in spite of the Battle of the North Atlantic. He supposes, however, that what actually happened subsequently could have been reliably foreseen - that if Japan attacked the U.S.A., Germany certainly would declare war on the U.S.A. in sympathy with Japan, after which the U.S.A. could swing into the European war.

Actually the declaration of war by Germany on the U.S.A. was a big blunder. Neither the Tripartite Pact (the Axis) nor Germany's general relations with Japan could have obligated Germany to declare war on any country attacked by Japan. After all, Japan did not declare war on the Soviet Union after Germany attacked that country.

This incident shows the occasional extreme importance of the specific, individual decision, surely the final responsibility of the highest figure in the country. This importance arises frequently in the Game of Diplomacy as well, even though geography and the current diplomatic scenario form the near background of every decision.

Of course, the U. S. A. might have just declared war on Germany anyway; but the Government greatly preferred to be seen as reacting necessarily; this because the Government had to diplomatize its own people, too; a problem which does not exist in the Game of Diplomacy.

Furthermore, the declaration of war requires the concurrence of each house of the Congress. If such a measure had been sought against Germany, based merely on the German alliance with Japan, the Battle of the North Atlantic, and the strategic wisdom of keeping Britain and Russia in the war; someone might have inquired publicly why, when the U.S.A. had just been attacked by Japan and suffered serious naval losses, and faced the prospect of a major war across the entire Pacific, it should suddenly spin around and declare war upon a major power in Europe as well.

In addition to the foregoing reasons, however, the American people might have accepted a declaration of war on Germany, even if Germany had not obliged by declaring war on the U.S.A., because they expected

to fight Germany sooner or later, partly due to the precedent of World War I.

The situation was not symmetric, however. If in some way Germany had gone ahead and attacked the United States with the intensity of the Pearl Harbor raid, would the United States thereupon have declared war on Japan as well? It does not seem very likely at all.

Most historians, interestingly, doubt that the Russian dabbling actually caused the war between Japan and the U.S.A. Venona Page 45. A difficulty with their view is that Secretary Hull's manner suddenly changed to antagonistic when he served the ultimatum. The Japanese took this as the last straw. Immediately their task force left for Hawaii. Six days later (December 2), their government ordered the attack.

Possibly the decision to serve an ultimatum at all was influenced by the text sent over by Secretary Morgenthau. Possibly the harshness of the text was instrumental. Certainly the Japanese could have just rejected the ultimatum, and treated American actions in the Pacific theatre as increasing vigilance in response to their own aggressions.

The United States had taken a series of actions that were vaguely menacing to Japan, following President Roosevelt's call to "quarantine the aggressors". Certainly Japan had committed severe aggression against Manchuria and China.

Previously the American fleet in the Pacific was based on the west coast of the United States, with only a squadron at Hawaii. In April, 1940, however, the fleet was sent to Hawaii for joint manoeuvres with the Hawaiian squadron; and then was ordered to remain there, basing itself at Pearl Harbor. Incidentally, the admiral in command of the fleet thought that Pearl Harbor was a poor base, due to lack of facilities, etc. He was removed. Stinnett Pages 17-18.

A comparable move in the Game of Diplomacy might be one in which France posts a fleet in the Gulf of Lyon or the Western Mediterranean, without an agreement with Italy. Yamamoto saw this rebasing of the American fleet as threatening. Agawa Pages 227-8.

We have mentioned force projection into "neutrals". The U. S. appears to have done this in the Dutch East Indies in September, 1940, when Holland embargoed shipment of oil to Japan, and agreed to allow American ships to base in the Dutch East Indies. Stinnett Pages 29, 39-40. Probably the American ships were intended to deter Japanese attack, or defend against it, and thus to encourage the Dutch to go ahead with the embargo. The Japanese negotiated until June, 1941, but failed to secure a lifting of the embargo. Stinnett Pages 40-42.

In July, 1941, England and the U. S. imposed a total embargo on Japan. Japan responded with military inductions, recalls of planes and ships from China, and so on. Stinnett Pages 119-120. The U. S. started a plan to build a large number of aircraft carriers in mid-1941; nearly a half year before Pearl Harbor. Stinnett Page 122. The U. S. also sent submarines to Manila in January, 1941. Bombers were also sent. The U. S. also sent small groups of cruisers into Japanese and other East Asian waters on an unpredictable schedule.

The question why the Japanese never attacked Russia might be answered simply that they were more afraid of the U.S.A. than of Russia. A message in which the Chairman of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, directed Yamamoto to plan for an attack on Hawaii in early December, 1941, opened with the words, "In the interest of self-defence and survival..." Agawa Page 237.

We might speculate further on the question. Russia's huge army was tied down in desperate defence against the Germans, but Japan's large army was tied down in China. For geographical reasons, the powerful Japanese fleet would be raised to its highest and best use against Southeast Asia, not against Siberia.

If Russia lost to Germany, Japan could pick up territory at that time. The opportunity for the surprise attack against the U. S. A., however, might not last forever. The U. S. A. was beefing up in the area, and the embargo was running.

Russia was very unlikely to attack Japan. The Americans, not the Russians, were demanding that Japan abandon the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, which action would have left Japan with no alliance at all, except the non-aggression pact with Russia. Interestingly, Agawa, in his life of Yamamoto, does not mention the possibility of Japan attacking Russia, although he devotes considerable space to differences of opinion concerning the attack on the U. S.

The possibility that the U. S. was "quarantining the aggressor" intentionally in the hope of distracting him from an attack on Russia makes sense; but we have not encountered any material to back it up. Perhaps it could be said to President Roosevelt's credit that he was careful and steadfast in combining opposition to aggression with strategic vision, never losing sight of the biggest picture. Stinnett, after writing a book which is heavily critical of the Administration, as its title implies, still largely admits this point in his introduction, Page xiv:

"Painful though they surely were, Roosevelt's decisions were strategically calculated to lead to the ultimate victory of allied forces over the Axis nations that threatened the liberties we all cherish. The advisors who formulated the provocative policies were staunch in their support though aware of the risks. I am mindful that it is easier to take a critical view of this policy a half century removed than to understand fully what went on in Roosevelt's mind in the year prior to Pearl Harbor."

Yet one could also argue that F.D.R.'s moves "quarantining the aggressor" in the Pacific were obvious, regional responses to Japanese force projection, without regard to Europe. The U.S.A. was the only power that could stand up to Japan in the Pacific at that time.

If the U.S. and Germany had not gone to war with each other, however, the U.S. would still have been left fighting Japan in one theatre while supplying England and Russia in the other; i. e., it would still have been involved globally, dividing attention between the two theatres; and, while it might have been more difficult, it would still have been just as important to keep Britain and Russia in the war.

Declaring War on France

by Stephen Agar

As a central power, it is important for Germany to gain momentum early on – before stronger neighbours move in on her home centres. In many respects the diplomatic situation in the west is simpler than in the east – there are only likely to be three Powers who have to resolve control of neutrals and removal of the isolated power in a quick two vs. one conflict. Furthermore, as an island power England is often cautious and more likely not to take sides in Spring 1901 (as F(Lon)-ENG can be difficult to explain).

So the question I want to pose, is assuming England cannot be persuaded to move to the Channel on the first move – how would Germany go about attacking France from the beginning of the game, in order to get a decisive advantage? The French defensive position is fairly secure and capable of protecting France while she picks up a couple of builds. Thus the key must be the element of surprise and Italian help – if you don't have both of these things going for you, then you should think again. Additionally, English neutrality is highly desirable – just offer England Bel, Bre and Por...

The Schlieffen plan (attacking France via Belgium) is not a good model of how to attack France in Diplomacy. By the time neutrals have been occupied and builds made, taking on France is all the harder. The initial war aim of Germany must be to get an army on to French soil and to minimise French builds. Ideally this would be done by agreeing a DMZ over Burgundy and breaking the agreement in Spring 1901. If Germany can get an army into Burgundy in S01, France must then be tempted to cover Mar and par to prevent herself from losing a home centre. So the optimum French opening moves to try and secure would be something like F(Bre)-MAO, A(Par)-Pic, A(Mar)-Spa.


That said, the most superficially aggressive anti-French opening a German player could make, isn't necessarily the best bet. A(Mun)-Bur would be essential – because once France has her 1901 builds, she can construct a Maginot Line very quickly. However, following up with A(Ber)-Mun is not sound as it doesn't really assist and could even get in the way.

Consider the following openings:

FRANCE: F(Bre)-MAO, A(Par)-Pic, A(Mar)-Spa.

GERMANY: F(Kie)-Hol, A(Mun)-Bur, A(Ber)-Kie ITALY: A(Ven)-Pie, F(Nap)-TYS, A(Rom)Std.

ITALY: A(Ven)-Pie, F(Nap)-TYS, A(Rom) Std. (or stand-off over Tri)



Spring 1901

In that situation, provided you are certain of Italian support for A(Bur)-Mar, then you cannot fail to take Mar. F(Hol) will go to Bel to make sure France can't take it (or give it to England as a sign of goodwill to get him to ally with you against France). Hence France gets one builds and Germany two (provided France doesn't get English help).


For example:

ENGLAND: F(NWG)-Nwy, F(NTH) C A(Yor)-Bel

FRANCE: F(MAO)-Por, A(Spa)-Mar, A(Pic)-Bel

GERMANY: F(Hol) S ENGLISH F(NTH)-Bel, A(Bur)-Mar, A(Kie)-Ruh

ITALY: A(Pie) S GERMAN A(Bur)-Mar, F(TYS) C A(Rom)-Tun



Autumn 1901

You need Mun to be free so you can build there – probably building A(Mun) and A(Kie) - while Italy goes for F(Nap). If France has moved back to Par all he can do is build A(Bre) – though if he has gone to Bel or Bur, he will be free to build in Paris instead. The key thing is to keep the French units split – i.e. keep the units in Iberia away from the units in France – while maintaining a superiority against Burgundy.


In Spring 1902 the screw is turned even tighter:

ENGLAND: A(Bel) s GERMAN A(Ruh) - Bur; F(Lon) - ENG; F(Nwy) Stands ; F(NTH) Stands ; F(Edi) Stands

FRANCE: F(Por) - MAO; A(Spa) - Gas (FAILED); A(Pic) s A(Par) - Bur; A(Par) - Bur (FAILED)

GERMANY: A(Ruh) - Bur; A(Mun) s A(Ruh) - Bur; A(Mar) - Gas (FAILED); F(Hol) Stands; A(Kie) - Ruh


ITALY: A(Pie) - Mar (FAILED); F(TYS) - WMS; A(Tun) Stands; F(Nap) - ION



Spring 1902

France now has real problems. Germany and Italy can combine to attack Spain, and defending Spain means that F(MAO) cannot protect Bre. If England orders F(ENG)-MAO, then any joint Italo-German attack on Spain succeeds (and has the additional benefit that if France does use F(MAO) to cover Bre then England takes MAO (following up into ENG from NTH). There are lots of possibilities in this position and France just can't cover them all.

It is worth considering what would happen if France ordered A(Spa)-Mar instead (in the belief that England wasn't going to support an attack on Bur).



Spring 1902

This is a lot worse from France's point of view, as he can no longer hold Paris, nor rule out a supported attack on Spain instead.

Conclusions

France's corner position can be turned very quickly even without English assistance in Spring 1901. However, Italian assistance is crucial – and quick progress against France inevitably needs English help in A01 to get the extra Army on to Burgundy.

Across the Whole Board

By Allan Calhamer

I. Drawing the Network

From the start of the game until such time as one Great Power is knocked out of contention (at which point the network changes), almost every war that takes place will occur along one of the twelve lines on the diagram, and almost every agreement will be aimed at preventing a war along one of the twelve lines of the diagram (fig. 1).




Fig. 1

II. Relation between Strength of Country and Number of Neighbours

As Diplomacy progressed from its initial form to its final market form, it was played frequently by a group of good players who steadily progressed in their understanding of the game against steadily improving opponents. The strength of the countries as determined by experience within this group ran from Turkey at the strongest down through Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and lastly, Germany. We note the close correspondence of that list to the list of countries in reverse order of the number of neighbours, as read off the network: Turkey, 2; England, France and Italy, 3; Russia and Austria-Hungary, 4; Germany 5.

III. An Aside concerning Strength of Countries

The relative strength of countries in postal play had generally followed the pattern given above, except for the single major anomaly that Russia was considered to be the strongest country. Her apparent strength diminished as that of the more defensively placed countries increased as the players gained experience.

Recent careful analysis has revealed a satisfactory opening variation for Italy against Turkey, called the Lepanto Opening. The remarks in the first part of this article assume that that opening is *not* being used. Later in this article we will describe and discuss the Lepanto Opening directly.

IV. Certain Alliances Schematized on the Network

Germany and Russia frequently lead off by forming an alliance in which both agree to refrain from moving to the Baltic Sea, Livonia, Prussia or Silesia. Russia may demand, and Germany may agree to permit, Russia entry into Sweden in Fall 1901 as part of this alliance. Germany may threaten to block that entry unless he gets the alliance. Germany and Austria-Hungary also frequently agree to refrain from moving to Silesia, Bohemia and Tyrolia.




Fig. 2.

If these agreements are kept, and they usually are (for neutralization agreements work fairly well in this game), then there will be no German-Russian or German-Austrian war in the early stages of the game. Thus we may erase those links from the diagram to see the effect on the whole-board considerations (fig. 2).

We now note that six countries each are linked to three neighbours, only Turkey differing in being linked to two. Thus we see the graphic illustration of this writer's belief that Germany needs two alliances, and Russia and Austria each one, in order to start the game on something like equal footing. This assumes that the other players have not yet made any alliances at all.

In thus modifying the network, it should be pointed out that an alliance is hardly as good as a defensive guarantee as geographic separation, for the alliance may be broken, and also a third party might come through the demilitarized zone sooner or later; but then schematic geographic separation is not ideal either, since it is not a perfect representation of the board.

Suppose we ask whether there is a likely alliance structure that can equalize the number of neighbours among all seven countries. There is: if, to the two alliances noted above, we add a Russian-Austrian alliance (neutralizing Galicia at least), and a German-Italian alliance (neutralizing Tyrolia) and an English-French alliance (neutralising the Channel, the Irish Sea and the North Atlantic), then each Power has just two links left on the network (fig. 3).




Fig. 3.

Needless to say, players would still regard one country or another as stronger or weaker, in part because an alliance is not as sure a defence as geographic separation. Suppose, then, that we devised an experimental game in which these alliances were made as binding as geography itself. Suppose we introduced into the experimental game the rule that no pieces could be moved to the aforementioned neutralized zones by any player. Suppose we also rules that no order was valid calling for an attack on a supply centre or province currently occupied by a unit unless the two countries involved were joined by a link in the reduced network shown in our last diagram.

Only after the imposition of those quite restrictive rules would the "number of neighbours" factor be removed from consideration. There would still be differences in strength, due to such factors as sea defences, number of early grabs, rapidity of build-up, and so on. By analysing or actually playing this reduced game, however, the player might help to separate in his mind the pervading number of neighbours consideration from the remainder. This separation might in turn help him to reconstitute the question of relative strength of countries in new situations as they arise.

V. Reverberation Theory

Suppose that after the first move (Spring 1901) has been played, we look around the board and determine apropos of each Power whether its first set of moves has been as expected, better than expected or worse than expected. We also determine whether each Power has been treated as expected by the events of the move, or better, or worse than expected. Our subjective opinion of the whole development for each Power relative to our subjective notion of the expected, may then be entered on the network diagram, alongside that Power's initial. Usually a simple plus or minus sign is all that can be justified, but double or triple signs may be employed.

Let us suppose for purposes of example that nothing unexpected has happened on the first move, except at one point, at which the development appears to benefit Italy and Austria-Hungary and harm

Turkey. The Lepanto Opening might be one such development. Listing the Powers in the first column (see table) we enter +1 or -1 in the second column as appropriate, representing the primary effect. The third column is derived by taking each Power's figure in the second column, reversing its sign, and awarding it to each of that Power's neighbours. Thus, if Italy has received a +1 in the second column, each of France, Germany and Austria-Hungary receives a -1 in the third column. Each Power's receipts in the third column are then added up to form the fourth column.

This process may then be represented as often as one wants: the figures for each country found in the fourth column may be reversed in sign and attributed to all that country's neighbours, forming a fifth column, with the accumulated partial results in that column added to form the sixth column and so forth.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
England			0	+++	+3	-3 -2 -3	-8
France		-	-1	+++	+3	-3 -2 -3	-8
Germany		--	-2	++	+2	-3 -3 -3 -4 -3	-16
Italy	+1	-	-1	+++	+3	-3 -2 -4	-9
Austria	+1	-+	0	++++	+4	-2 -3 -3	-8
Russia		-+	0	+++	+3	-3 -2 -4	-9
Turkey	-1	-	-1		0	-4 -3	-7

The second column shows that Italy and Austria have benefited, and Turkey lost, the result of the subjective appraisal of the position. The fourth column places Austria (0) ahead of Italy (-1), indicating that the event may have benefited Austria more than her ally. The reason is that the country harmed is a neighbour of Austria, but not of Italy. Among the countries not involved in the primary effect, Germany (-2) has lost the most as she neighbours two countries which have benefited; France (-1) neighbours only one country that benefited; England (0) neighbours no country that benefited or lost, and Russia (also 0) neighbours one country that benefited and one that suffered. The sixth column fails to separate England and Russia, but the eighth column indicates that England has done a hair better than Russia, apparently because Austria's gains pose a greater threat to Russia than to England, while Turkey does not appear quite correspondingly weak, apparently again because of his small number of neighbours.

Thus the greatest benefit from this development apparently accrued to Austria, and less in order to Italy, England, Russia, France, Germany and Turkey. The high standing of England in this list make some wonder whether England should suggest the Lepanto Opening to Italy during the first Diplomacy period, a notion that would never have occurred to me if I had not analysed the matter as shown above. The answer nevertheless is probably no; for other Italian plays such as an early attack on France would score higher for England; and perhaps France should have been awarded a plus at the outset, because the opening turns Italy away from his door, at least for a while. In an ordinary game I would probably also arbitrarily reduce the contribution between Germany and Austria, or eliminate it altogether, when reverberating the first move results; but for the purposes of conveying the principle here we did not want to introduce arbitrary factors, which each user of the tool would introduce for himself.

VI. Diamond Theory

When there are just four countries left in a game, they frequently, though not invariably, neighbour each other in such a way as to form a diamond-shaped diagram (fig. 4).

We note that the two centre countries have three neighbours each, whereas the two apex countries have only two. Theory would lead us to believe that the apex countries would have the advantage. Naturally, then, as a player lays out his early strategy, and as the possibility of his being left in the Council of Four increases, he wants to jockey himself into an apex position rather than a centre position. Thus we see another reason for the advantage that edge and corner countries have in this

game: if they arrive at the Council of Four, they are much more likely to do so as apex countries, than are the centre countries.




Fig.4.

It is informative in this regard to turn again to the network of seven countries, and imagine each country eliminated in turn, considering the more likely connectivities to occur across the territory of the defeated, then altering the diagram appropriately; then considering the likelihood of being left on the apex, or the centre, if various successful endeavours are conducted on the six-Power network. Imagining himself playing each Power in turn, the player can postulate sufficient alliances to knock out two of the remaining powers in various combinations, noting that some of these successes may leave him as an Apex Power and others as a Centre Power.

Naturally, then, one would expect alert Centre Powers to attempt to ally with each other to fend off the Apex Powers, and one would expect Apex Powers to act to keep the Centre Powers apart. Centre Powers cannot always keep off each other as they might like to, because the vagaries of the position, including the important division of earth-space into land and sea and of forces into land and sea forces, interferes with theory; and all such interferences tend to favour the Apex Powers. As Diplomacy players, however, we do not want to rest with a mere all-other-factors-being-equal analysis. The player will want to determine in general how important the apex position is in relation to other matters such as number of units. suppose for simplicity that the two Centre Powers are of equal size, and the two Apex Powers are of equal size. Do we tend to arrive at an equal game when the Centre Powers are twice as large as the Apex Powers? Three times? One and a half times? With a workable ratio in mind, the player has more flexibility; he can allow himself to be jockeyed into the centre position if he gets enough advantage in units to compensate. He may know how many units he can offer in his effort to jockey someone else into centre position.

VII. Alliances of Three Countries Not in Contact with All the Other Four

Four countries in alliance ought to be able to defeat the other three, sooner or later, but four-Power alliances are hard to put together and hard to keep together. It can be expected to be easier with three Powers and still easier with two. Indeed, most alliances in most games turn out to be two-Power alliances, and they seldom amalgamate quite completely into four Powers against the other three. (one recalls World War II in which Russia did not go to war against Japan until 1945.) I think that the three-Power alliance has sometimes been underestimated, in particular a three-Power alliance in which there is one Power remaining among the other four Powers who does not border on the allied three can be quite good. Suppose, for example, that England, France and Germany allied with one another, sorted out the small states in their area into appropriate spheres of influence, set up sufficient neutralized zones, and began pressing outwards against Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Sooner or later one would expect, in the worst case, a wall of resistance to form among those three. What, then, would Turkey do? Turkey's mere physical presence in the rear of Russia-Austria-Italy is a serious detriment to them, which is not matched by anything in the rear of England-France-Germany. Thus, in most cases, Turkey will find herself thrown in automatically with the original three. The result is a four to three alliance structure, but one in which the side containing four members has actually had the burden of negotiating among only three.

The network diagram makes it easy to determine the few cases in which such three-Power alliances may be formed. Out of 35 possible three-power alliances drawn from a population of seven countries, just seven will be such that the three countries are not in contact with all the other four (Fig. 5).




Fig. 5.

Let us now consider a modification of the network involving the Lepanto Opening. This cleverly calculated opening in a way reminding one of the Hypermodern openings in chess (which appear to contradict principle) calls for Italy to open with A(Ven) hold, A(Rom)-Apu, F(Nap)-ION. He continues with A(Ven) holds, F(ION) C A(Apu)-Tun, build F(Nap). Then, A(Ven) hold, F(ION) - EMS, F(Nap)-ION. Finally, A(Ven) hold, F(ION) & F(EMS) C A(Tun)-Syr. Austria usually rushes into the Balkans, leaving Trieste exposed in order to gain the upper hand against Turkey. There is also some question whether the Italy-Germany connection is important enough for the network. Italy uses it only rarely and Germany hardly ever. It is something of a matter of choice whether to include it or not - suppose we eliminate it here. Then we find that the diagram taking into account the Lepanto Opening changes as indicated below, and the number of three power alliances which do not neighbour all the other four Powers, is reduced to four (as indicated in Fig. 6.).

Creating an initial three-player alliance seems to work quite well in over-the-board play, but not so well in postal play. Over the board it is easy and fast for three players to talk things over. A group of three contains three different pairs and there is not time in postal play for various

proposals and counter-proposals to move up and down the three sides of a triangle.

When the alliance is undertaken in a certain way, however, there is too much time in postal play rather than too little. I experimented recently with planning one of the above three-power alliances on a fair basis for all three, but then arranging it closely with just one of the others, after which we two offered the alliance to the third along with an ultimatum that we would jointly attack him if he refused. In the over-the-board game the alliance was accepted at once and worked out well. There was, however, only a few minutes available to the third man in which to make his decision. When I tried the same thing in postal play, the third man had a couple of weeks in which to brood over the ultimatum, during which he agreed and then refused, protesting the nature of the ultimatum, demanding compensation for his injured feelings, and finally withdrawing from the game, an act which relieved us under the circumstances.

Possibly for better results in the postal game the ultimatum (which should never be called that, or be otherwise offensively worded - it should be moderately worded, but clear) should be sent at such a time that the recipient will have to accept it or reject it within a couple of days.





Fig. 6.



Marne (Autumn 1903)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Howard Bishop) A(Gal) - War; A(Tri) s A(Vie) - Tyr (CUT); A(Vie) - Tyr; A(Tyr) - Pie; F(Gre) Stands

ENGLAND (Garyth Wright) F(NAO) - Lpl; F(NTH) s F(Lon) - ENG; F(Lon) - ENG (FAILED); F(Hol) - Bel (FAILED); A(Nwy) - Swe

FRANCE (Tim Deacon) F(IRI) s F(Bre) - ENG; F(Bre) - ENG (FAILED); F(MAO) - NAO; A(Pic) s A(Bur); A(Bur) s A(Bel) - Ruh; A(Bel) - Ruh (FAILED)

GERMANY (Neil Hopkins) F(Den) - HEL; A(Ruh) s A(Kie) - Hol (CUT); A(Kie) - Hol (FAILED); A(Mun) s A(Ruh)

ITALY (Jeremy Tullett) F(EMS) - Smy (FAILED); A(Rom) - Nap; A(Ven) - Tri (FAILED); F(Tun) - ION

RUSSIA (Mike Dean) F(StP) nc - Nwy; A(Swe) - Den; F(BAL) s A(Swe) - Den; F(Sev) - BLA (FAILED)

TURKEY (Ellis Simpson) F(Ank) - BLA (FAILED); A(Rum) - Sev (FAILED); A(Arm) - Smy (FAILED); A(Bul) Stands; F(ION) - AEG

Autumn 1903 Adjustments:

A: +War, Tri, Gre, Ser, Bud, Vie = 6; Gains 1. Builds A(Vie).
 E: Lpl, Lon, Hol, +Swe, Edi, -Nwy = 5; No change.
 F: Bre, Bel, Spa, Por, Mar, Par = 6; No change.
 G: Kie, Mun, Ber -Den = 3; Loses 1. GM removes F(HEL).
 I: Nap, Ven, Rom, Tun = 4; No change.
 R: +Nwy, +Den, Sev, StP, Mos, -Swe, -War = 5; No change. Builds A(Mos).
 T: Ank, Rum, Bul, Con, Smy = 5; No change.

Press

RUSSIA - All: I seem to have forgotten the meaning of "diplomacy" this season. My apologies. I guess it will show in the results this turn! Will try harder!

Yates (Autumn 1908)


This game has been declared a 3-way draw between Dave Wreathall (England), Pete Birks (France) and Ian Northcott (Turkey). Pete has already given me an endgame statement – I'll publish a SC chart etc. next time plus any other statements I get. Well done chaps and thanks to all of you (and Jeremy) for seeing the game through.

Doncaster (Autumn 1901)

This game has been abandoned by the common consent of the five active players (Griff Lewis, John Stratford, Ian Northcott, Dave Wreathall, Bruce Edwards).

Hoplite Wars - Chester

This game has been abandoned by the common consent of the five remaining active players.



Brighton (Autumn 1903)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Anarchy – Ex-Chris Jones) F(Alb) Stands ; A(Vie) Stands

ENGLAND (Garyth Wright) F(SKA) - Den; F(NTH) s F(SKA) - Den; F(HEL) s F(SKA) - Den

FRANCE (Bruce Edwards) A(Pic) s A(Bur) - Bel; A(Bur) - Bel (FAILED); A(Tyr) - Mun (FAILED); F(MAO) - WMS

GERMANY (Mike Benyon) F(Swe) - Den* (FAILED, DISLODGED TO BAL); A(Kie) s F(Swe) - Den; A(Ber) s A(Mun); A(Mun) Stands; A(Hol) s A(Ruh) - Bel; A(Ruh) - Bel (FAILED)

ITALY (Anarchy – Ex-John Dennett) A(Apu) Stands ; A(Ven) Stands ; F(ADS) Stands ; F(ION) Stands (DISLODGED - DISBANDED BY GM)

RUSSIA (Mark Wightman) F(BAR) s F(Nwy); F(Nwy) s A(Fin) - Swe; A(War) - Sil; A(Rum) - Gal; A(Bud) s TURKISH A(Ser) - Tri; A(Fin) - Swe; F(BLA) - Rum

TURKEY (Ian Northcott) A(Ser) - Tri; A(Bul) - Ser; A(Gre) - Alb (FAILED); F(AEG) s F(EMS) - ION; F(EMS) - ION

Autumn 1903 Adjustments

A: Vie -Bud, -Tri = 1; Loses 2. Removes F(Alb)
 E: +Den, Edi, Lon, Lpl = 4; Gains 1. Builds F(Lpl).
 F: Spa, Por, Bre, Mar, Par = 5; No change. Builds F(Mar).
 G: Kie, Ber, Mun, Hol, Bel -Den = 5; Loses 1. Removes F(BAL).
 I: Ven, Tun, Nap, Rom = 4; No change. 1 short.
 R: Nwy, +Bud, Swe, Rum, War, Mos, Sev, StP = 8; Gains 1. Builds A(Mos)
 T: +Tri, Ser, Gre, Con, Ank, Smy = 6; Gains 1. Builds F(Con).

Press

Russia / All: With the abandonment of Italy (and possibly Austria) is there really any point in playing this game? Or do you, like me, think it has already been spoilt. I've proposed the 5-way draw just in case you all think like I do. If you don't then I'll be happy to play on.
F > G: Sorry, a change of heart, based on your ominous silence.
F > R/T: Well, that's made it a lot easier for you, hasn't it? How long do you want to delay the inevitable??
Endgame Proposal 5-way draw between E/F/R/T/G. Please vote, unanimity required. Abstention = no, NMRs = yes.

Abstraction II

TANNENBURG (May 1915)

AUSTRIA John Colledge, Dunoroch, 24 Brunstane Bank, Edinburgh, EH15 2NR: A(Swa) S RUSSIAN A(Boh)-Mun (NO SUCH ORDER); A(Ser) S A(Bul); A(Ode)-Mos (FAILS); A(Bul) Std.; F(ION)-Gre; A(Ukr) S A(Ode)-Mos; A(Vie)-Boh (FAILS)

ENGLAND Chris Martin, 444 w49th #1AG, New York, NY 10019, USA: F(Hol)-SKA* (MISORDER, DISLODGED, DISBANDED); F(SAO)-Por; F(MAO) S F(SAO)-Por; A(Bre) S FRENCH A(Lyo)-Par (no such order); F(NTH) S F(ANG); F(Lon)-ENG; F(ANG) S A(ANG)-Den

FRANCE John Boocock, 25 Melrose Drive, Peterborough, PE2 9DN: NMR! A(Mar)* (DISLODGED, DISBANDS NRO); A(Lyo) stand unordered.

GERMANY Dave Clark, 74B Chester Road, Castle Bromwich, Birmingham, B36 9BU: A(Swe)-Den (FAILS); A(Pic)-Bel; A(Par)-Lyo (FAILS); F(HEL)-Hol; F(Den)-ANG* (DISLODGED, DISBANDS, NRO); A(Dre)-Mun; A(War) S RUSSIAN A(StP)-Mos; A(Mun)-Ruh; F(Kie) S F(HEL)-Hol


ITALY Bruce Edwards, 29 Aeron Close, Barry, South Glam, CF62 7PX: F(WMS)-Tun (FAILS); A(And)-Por (FAILS); A(Cat)-Mar; A(Alg)-Tun (FAILS); A(Pie) S A(Cat)-Mar; F(CMS) S AUSTRIAN F(ION)-Gre; F(GoL)-And (FAILS); F(EMS)-Dam (FAILS)

RUSSIA Bob Pitman, 19 Honeysuckle Close, Locksheath, Southampton, Hants. SO31 6WF: A(StP)-Mos (FAILS); A(Mos)-Vol; A(Nwy)Std.; A(Boh)-Vie (FAILS); F(BAR)-NWG

TURKEY Nick Gladstone, 1 Rosemary Terrace, St. Agnes, TR5 OUF: F(Egy)-EMS (FAILS); A(Lib)-Egy (FAILS); A(Mac) boards F(AEG), F(AEG)-CYS, A(CYS) disembarks Dam (FAILS); F(Con)-WBS; F(Smy)-Con

June 1915

A: Vie, Bud, Pec, Zar, Zur, Ser, Bul, Rum, +Gre = 9. Builds A(Bud), A(Zar)
 E: Edi, Lpl, Ply, Lon, Bre, Ire, Mor, -Hol, +Por, +Den = 9. Builds F(Edi), A(Lon).
 F: Lyo, -Mar = 1. No change.
 G: Kie, Ber, Mun, Dre, -Den, Bel, Par, Swe, War, +Hol = 9. Builds A(Dre)
 I: Ven, Rom, Nap, Sic, Tun, -Por, And, Cas, +Mar = 8. No change.
 R: StP, Mos, -Ode, Arc, Nwy = 4. Removes 1 A(Boh).
 T: Con, Smy, Sin, Dam, Egy, -Gre = 5. Removes A(Lib)



Jackson (Spring 1909)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Jeremy Tullett) A(Vie) s A(Tri) - Tyr; A(Ven) s A(Tri) - Tyr; A(Tri) - Tyr; A(Bud) Stands; A(War) - Sil* (FAILED, DISLODGED TO Ukr); A(Gal) s A(War) - Sil

FRANCE (Anarchy – Ex-George Hornby) A(Mar) Stands ; A(Gas) Stands ; A(Par) Stands ; A(Tun) Stands


GERMANY (Colin Bruce) F(NWG) - NTH; A(Lpl) - Yor; F(MAO) - Spa sc; F(ENG) - MAO; F(Bre) - Gas (FAILED); A(Bur) - Mar (FAILED); A(Tyr) - Boh; A(Mun) s A(Tyr) - Boh; A(Lvn) - War; A(Pru) s A(Lvn) - War; A(Sil) s A(Lvn) - War; A(Ber) s A(Sil); A(Por) s F(MAO) - Spa sc; A(StP) - Mos (FAILED)

ITALY (Anarchy – Ex-Mark Underhay) A(Rom) Stands* (DISLODGED - DISBANDED BY GM)

TURKEY (Tim Deacon) F(TYS) s F(Nap) - Rom; F(Nap) - Rom; F(Pie) - GoL; F(Gre) - ION; A(Rum) s A(Bul); A(Bul) Stands; A(Con) - Ank; A(Mos) s AUSTRIAN A(War) (MISORDER); A(Sev) s A(Mos)

Press

Turkey - Germany: Thanks for the offer of a two way draw but I think it's a poisoned Chalice as you are likely to get to 18 SC's in a season or two. Hence my leaving Mar and Austria alone!



Marlborough (Spring 1907)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Keith Loveys- NMR!) A(Alb) Stands* (DISLODGED - DISBANDED BY GM); A(Bud) Stands ; A(Rum) Stands ; A(Ukr) Stands ; A(War) Stands* (DISLODGED - DISBANDED BY GM); F(ADS) Stands

ENGLAND (Pete Duxon) F(Spa) nc - MAO (FAILED); F(Por) - Spa sc (FAILED); F(MAO) - WMS (FAILED); F(Mar) - GoL; A(Bur) - Mun; A(Boh) - Gal; A(Pru) s A(Sil) - War; A(Sil) - War; F(BAL) c A(Den) - Lvn; F(Lon) - ENG; F(NTH) c A(Edi) - Bel; F(StP) nc Stands; A(Lpl) - Wal; F(Nwy) s F(StP) nc; A(Den) - Lvn; A(Edi) - Bel

FRANCE (Anarchy – Ex-Paul Evans) A(Par) Stands


ITALY (Anarchy – Ex-Richard Gee) A(Ven) Stands

TURKEY (Keith Smith) A(Ser) - Alb; A(Gre) - Ser; F(Bul) sc - Gre; A(Con) - Bul; F(ION) s A(Ser) - Alb; F(Rom) - TYS; F(Tun) - WMS (FAILED); A(Arm) s A(Sev); A(Smy) - Con; A(Sev) Stands

Press

Turkey-England: You are almost there, but make just one slip...

Versailles: The concession to England was defeated.



Ascot (Autumn 1904)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Ian Northcott) A(Boh) s ITALIAN A(Tyr) - Mun (MISORDER); A(Gal) - Sil; A(Rum) - Gal; A(Ser) - Rum; A(Bul) s F(Con); F(Con) s ITALIAN A(Syr) - Smy ENGLAND (Dave Wreathall)

F(BAR) s A(StP); F(NWG) - NTH (FAILED); F(NTH) - ENG (FAILED);
A(StP) Stands; F(ENG) - MAO (FAILED) FRANCE (Mark Stretch)
A(Mar) s A(Gas) - Bur; A(Gas) - Bur (FAILED); A(Spa) s A(Mar); F(Bre)
- MAO* (FAILED, DISLODGED - DISBANDED NRP)

GERMANY (Martin Draper) A(Ruh) - Bur (FAILED); A(Mun) s A(Ruh) -
Bur; A(Pic) - Bre; A(Par) s A(Pic) - Bre; A(Kie) s A(Mun); A(Sil) - Boh*
(FAILED, DISLODGED TO Pru); F(Den) Stands; F(GoB) – BAL

ITALY (Richard Hucknall) A(Syr) - Smy; A(Tyr) - Vie; F(EMS) s A(Syr) -
Smy; F(ION) - AEG; F(Pie) – GoL

RUSSIA (Dave Anderson) A(War) s AUSTRIAN A(Gal) - Sil; A(Mos) s
A(War); F(Sev) - BLA (FAILED)

TURKEY (Anarchy - ex-Chris Jones) F(Smy) Stands* (DISLODGED -
DISBANDED NRP); F(BLA) Stands

Autumn 1904 Adjustments

A: Rum, Bul, +Con, Bud, Ser, Tri, -Vie = 6; No change.


E: StP, Nwy, Lon, Edi, Lpl = 5; No change.

F: Mar, Spa, Por -Bre = 3; Loses 1. G: Mun, +Bre, Par, Kie, Den, Hol,
Swe, Bel, Ber = 9; Gains 1. Builds A(Ber).

I: +Smy, +Vie, Gre, Rom, Tun, Nap, Ven = 7; Gains 2. Builds A(Ven),
A(Rom).

R: War, Mos, Sev = 3; No change.

T: Ank -Smy, -Con = 1; Loses 2.



Ypres (Spring 1901)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Daniel Mitchell) F(Tri) - ADS; A(Bud) - Ser;
A(Vie) - Tri (FAILED)

ENGLAND (Andrew Guy) F(Lon) - ENG; F(Edi) - NWG; A(Lpl) - Yor


FRANCE (Eamonn Rogers) A(Par) - Bur; A(Mar) s A(Par) - Bur; F(Bre) -
MAO

GERMANY (Ian Good) F(Kie) - Den; A(Ber) - Kie; A(Mun) - Bur
(FAILED)

ITALY (Jeff Simard) A(Ven) - Tri (FAILED); A(Rom) - Ven (FAILED);
F(Nap) - ION

RUSSIA (Matthias Wieler) F(Sev) - BLA (FAILED); A(Mos) - Ukr; A(War)
- Gal; F(StP) sc - GoB

TURKEY (Ian Ashcroft) A(Con) - Bul; A(Smy) - Con; F(Ank) - BLA
(FAILED)



Arras (Autumn 1901)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (John Campbell) F(ADS) - Ven (FAILED); A(Ser) -
Gre (FAILED); A(Tri) - Ser (FAILED)

ENGLAND (Warren Galenzoski) F(NWG) - Nwy; F(NTH) c A(Yor) - Bel;
A(Yor) - Bel

FRANCE (Richard Scholefield) F(MAO) - TYS (MISORDER); A(Gas) -
Spa; A(Spa) - Por

GERMANY (Ian Northcott) F(Den) Stands; A(Mun) Stands; A(Kie) - Hol

ITALY (Tim Deacon) A(Ven) Stands; A(Rom) s A(Ven); F(ION) - Tun

RUSSIA (Tracey Jackson) F(GoB) - Swe; A(Sil) - Ber; A(Ukr) - Rum;
F(Rum) - Sev

TURKEY (Jimmy Cowie) F(BLA) c A(Arm) - Bul; A(Bul) - Gre (FAILED);
A(Arm) - Bul (FAILED)

Autumn 1901 Adjustments

A: +Ser, Tri, Bud, Vie = 4; Gains 1. Builds A(Bud).

E: +Nwy, +Bel, Edi, Lon, Lpl = 5; Gains 2. Builds F(Lpl), F(Lon).


F: +Spa, +Por, Bre, Mar, Par = 5; Gains 2. Builds A(Par), F(Bre).

G: +Den, Mun, +Hol, Kie -Ber = 4; Gains 1. Builds A(Kie).

I: Ven, Rom, +Tun, Nap = 4; Gains 1. Builds F(Nap).

R: +Swe, +Ber, +Rum, Sev, Mos, StP, War = 7; Gains 3. Builds A(Mos),
A(War), A(StP).

T: +Bul, Ank, Con, Smy = 4; Gains 1. Builds A(Con).



Mons (Spring 1905)

ENGLAND (Dave Clark) F(ENG) s F(NTH); F(NTH) s F(ENG); A(StP) -
Mos; A(Nwy) - StP; F(BAR) - Nwy (FAILED)


FRANCE (Jimmy Cowie) F(NAO) c A(Bre) - Lpl; F(MAO) c A(Bre) - Lpl;
A(Bre) - Lpl

GERMANY (Richard Scholefield) F(Den) - SKA; F(Kie) - Den; A(Swe) -
Nwy (FAILED); F(Hol) - Bel (FAILED); A(Bur) - Bel (FAILED); A(Par) -
Bre; A(Mar) - Gas; A(Mun) - Boh; A(Ber) - Sil

ITALY (Nick Parish) F(ION) s F(AEG); F(AEG) s F(ION) (CUT); F(Nap) -
TYS; A(Vie) s A(Tri) - Bud; A(Tri) - Bud; A(Ven) - Tri (FAILED)

RUSSIA (Bruce Edwards) A(Mos) - Ukr; A(Bud) - Gal; A(Gal) - War

TURKEY (Tim Deacon) F(EMS) s F(Gre) - AEG; F(Gre) - AEG (FAILED); F(Con) - Smy; F(BLA) - Con; F(Rum) - Sev; A(Alb) - Tri; A(Bul) s A(Ser); A(Ser) s A(Alb) – Tri




Albert (Autumn 1901)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Clive Dechant) F(Tri) Stands; A(Bud) - Ser; A(Vie) - Gal (FAILED)
 ENGLAND (Bob Pitman) F(NTH) c A(Yor) - Bel; F(ENG) s A(Yor) - Bel; A(Yor) - Bel
 FRANCE (Franck Delcroix) A(Spa) - Por; A(Pic) - Bur; F(Gas) - Spa nc
 GERMANY (Steve Betteley) A(Bur) - Par; A(Kie) - Hol; F(Den) - Swe (FAILED)
 ITALY (Sean Haugen - NMR!) A(Ven) Stands ; A(Rom) Stands ; F(ION) Stands
 RUSSIA (Glen Morris) A(War) s A(Ukr) - Gal; A(Ukr) - Gal; F(GoB) - Swe (FAILED); F(Sev) - Rum
 TURKEY (John Campbell) A(Bul) - Gre; A(Con) - Bul; F(Ank) - Con

Autumn 1901 Adjustments

A: Tri, +Ser, Vie, Bud = 4; Gains 1. Builds A(Bud).
 E: +Bel, Edi, Lon, Lpl = 4; Gains 1. Builds F(Lpl).
 F: +Por, +Spa, Bre, Mar, -Par = 4; Gains 1. Builds A(Bre).
 G: +Par, +Hol, +Den, Ber, Kie, Mun = 6; Gains 3. Builds F(Kie), A(Mun), A(Ber).
 I: Ven, Rom, Nap = 3; No change.
 R: War, +Rum, Mos, Sev, StP = 5; Gains 1. Builds A(Mos).
 T: +Gre, +Bul, Con, Ank, Smy = 5; Gains 2. Builds F(Smy), F(Ank).



Heligoland (Autumn 1904)


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Emperor Franz Josef) A(Bud) s A(Vie)* (CUT, DISLODGED - DISBANDED NRP); A(Vie) s A(Bud)* (CUT, DISLODGED - DISBANDED NRP)
 ENGLAND (Caveat) F(Lon) - NTH; A(Lpl) Stands
 FRANCE (Petit Chou) A(Bur) s GERMAN A(Mun) (MISORDER); A(Par) s A(Bur); A(Pic) s A(Bur); F(ENG) - Lon; F(Wal) s F(ENG) - Lon; A(Yor) s ENGLISH A(Lpl) - Edi (MISORDER)
 GERMANY (Visigoth) A(Kie) - Hol; A(Bel) s A(Mun) - Bur; A(Mun) - Bur (FAILED); A(Ruh) s A(Bel); F(NTH) - Nwy; F(SKA) s F(NTH) - Nwy
 ITALY (Greenslade) F(ION) Stands; A(Boh) - Vie; A(Tri) s A(Boh) - Vie; A(Tyr) s A(Boh) - Vie
 RUSSIA (Agar) A(Gal) s A(Rum) - Bud; A(Rum) - Bud; F(BLA) - Rum; A(Ukr) s F(BLA) - Rum; F(Arm) - BLA; F(Nwy) - Swe
 TURKEY (The Great Panjandrum - NMR!) A(Gre) Stands ; A(Ser) Stands ; F(Con) Stands ; F(Ank) Stands ; A(Bul) Stands ; F(AEG) Stands

Autumn 1904 Adjustments

A: -Bud, -Vie, -Tri = 0 Loses 3. OUT!
 E: +Lpl, Edi, -Lon = 2; No change.
 F: Par, +Lon, Bre, Por, Spa, Mar -Lpl = 6; No change.
 G: Hol, Bel, Mun, +Nwy, Den, Ber, Kie = 7; Gains 1. Builds F(Kie).
 I: +Vie, +Tri, Ven, Tun, Nap, Rom = 6; Gains 2. Builds F(Nap), A(Ven).
 R: +Bud, Rum, +Swe, War, Mos, Sev, StP -Nwy = 7; Gains 1. Builds A(StP).
 T: Gre, Ser, Con, Ank, Bul, Smy = 6; No change.

Press

Ber(Govt.)-Paris: I *was* friendly until I saw your last turns moves and press.
StP (govt) - Turkey: Not really no, so here you go - hope I'm not making a mistake!
Fre (Gov) - It (Gov): keep it as we are - the DMZ looks great. A Mar is so I can move Picardy without letting the Visigoth push through Burgundy
Germany- England: Hope we guessed right between us, against the slimy Frog.
Fre (Gov) - Ger (Gov): we need our armies elsewhere - next season let's each retreat one army??
Germany- Russia: Sorry meant Nwy! I do not intend to come any further.
StP (govt) - Germany: Sorry, there was a botch up with my last adjudication and I thought I HAD given you Sweden, now I am worried about Nwy and so you can have it, I will have Swe, OK?
Germany- Italy: I think that it would be to our mutual benefit if we worked on taking out France together, before he gets too big, what do you think?
Fre (gov) - Ger (gov): Good luck against the Russian. If you don't mention that you want Edi in this turns press I may take it myself
StP (govt) - France: The Visigoth and I are chums!
Paris - Berlin: Less of the pushing please. Think Nordic. Think Swedish dolly birds
Italy - Austria: This is mainly a housekeeping exercise, as the Balkans is too crowded at the moment.
Paris to Berlin - I trust you
ANON- Panjy: Looks like the Kaiser heard you!
F-Russia - do you see your northern conquests going down the pan? join with England and France against the Hun
F-I: I presumed that you were more interested in A ustria.
StP (govt) - Italy: Give me a grand plan, I like your style and will be your vassal





WAITING LISTS

Diplomacy

Postal Diplomacy: Warren Galenzoski

Email Diplomacy: For the latest waiting list go to <http://www.armisticeday.com>

Five Italies: Jim Burgess, Toby Harris, Tim Deacon, Bruce Edwards, Frank Bacher. This looks as though it is full. I will confirm by email that you still want to play – Toby are you still in?

Railway Rivals

(to be run in a new subzine *Diversions* from Rip Gooch)
starting next issue!

Northern Italy Map P: 3 wanted. Bruce Edwards, Ken Laidlaw

South Sweden Map SWE: 4 wanted.

Netherlands: 1 wanted. Kevin Lee, Brad Martin, Allan Stagg, Tim?

Isle of Wight: Full. Charlie Wilson, Jim Reader, Pat Carey, Bruce Edwards

Volunteers wanted for the **Trans-Canada Map Experiment** (essentially a very very long thin map). Kevin Lee, Jim Reader.

Playlist for Issue 11

Stunt (Barenaked Ladies); England, Half English (Billy Bragg and the Blokes); I Love My Friends (Stephen Duffy); My Aim Is True (Elvis Costello); I'm Your Fan - Songs of Leonard Cohen (Various); Still Life (Van der Graaf Generator); Grand Opera Lane (Ron Sexsmith and the Uncool); Blonde on Blonde (Dylan); Electric Warrior (T Rex); Legend (Bob Marley).

, your credit status =

Space for Personal Messages:

CONS

OXCON 2002 February 15th-17th

Friday Evening: Laser Quest - please let us know in advance if you intend/hope to come to this by contacting James Pinnion (james.pinnion@keb.ox.ac.uk)

Saturday and Sunday main events taking place at: Keble College, Oxford. Doors open by 10AM (same rooms as last year - with partitions removed and more tables!)

Saturday: Diplomacy Tournament (starting 11AM - sign up by 10:50); 15 to 1 (starting after the Dip) Sunday: Settlers Tournament (Starting 11 AM - sign up by 10:50); Lost Cities (starting after the settlers)

Other ad hoc (non tournament) games will be played throughout the weekend. Cost: Entrance: £2, Diplomacy, Settlers: £3 Lost Cities: £1, Entire event: £6. Half price for students. For general information (including tournament rules) check out <http://come.to/oxcon>.

Please note we recommend not attempting to park in Oxford for the day - the park and ride is cheap (about two pounds if you're not planning on staying overnight) and the bus stops very close to Keble. If you have queries on Laser Quest, transport or anything else please e-mail james.pinnion@keb.ox.ac.uk or dipsoc@hotmail.com.

MASTERCON MIDLAND (22nd – 24th February 2002)

Will be held at the Hind Hotel, Wellingborough, Northamptonshire. Hopefully we will see lots of you there, if only for the fact that Keith will not be playing Dip unless the numbers are such he is required. A rare treat for all. This year, prizes will be available for: Diplomacy 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Settlers 1st place trophy. 18XX 1st place trophy

Location: The Hind Hotel is in the MasterCon tradition quite elegant and is supposedly where Cromwell slept before the Battle of Naseby, and boasts a priest hole. It is located in Sheep street, which is on the one way system. The hotel sits within a reasonable sized precinct of shops. Picked for its easy access from North, South, East and West. Motorway access is via M1, junction 15 or 16.

Rooms: The hotel has 34 en-suite rooms and an overspill hotel is available within six minutes walk of the Hind. Rooms will cost:- £45.00 per night per room for a single / twin.; £55.00 per night per room for a double. With notice, rooms can be shared by three people.

Registration for Master Con: This will take place in the Games room and here you will be able to sign up for any games and will be given the MasterCon 2002 Championship rules booklet. Registration will be £10.

Booking: This can be done in one of three ways: By post, to Eve and Keith Smith, MASTERCON, 71 Cross Street, Kettering, Northamptonshire, NN16 9DJ. By telephone, 01536 358165 By e-mail, to David Norman : david@ellought.demon.co.uk

WORLDDIPCON XII

The Diplomacy Association of Australia and New Zealand will host **World DipCon XII** on **29 March to 1 April 2002** in **Canberra, Australia**. Full details of the convention plans are available at daanz.org.au/wdc2002.

MANORCON

The long-running annual convention **ManorCon XX** will be held on **19-22 July 2002** at **Chamberlain Hall** in **Birmingham, England, UK**. You can find schedules and directions at the [ManorCon website](http://www.manorcon.org) and its [ManorCon flyer page](http://www.manorcon.org). For more details, contact Steve Jones or Kath Collman at manorcon@diplom.org.

MIDCON

MidCon will be held on **1-3 November 2002** at the **Birmingham City Thistle Hotel** in **Birmingham, England, UK**. This convention (annual since 1980) has for many years hosted the **UK National Diplomacy Championships**. Find details at the MidCon website (<http://www.sfcp.co.uk/Events/Midcon/index.htm>). For more information, send e-mail to midcon@sfcp.co.uk, or write to Midcon, 17 Crendon Street, High Wycombe HP13 6LJ.